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Standard explanations for the observed income heterogeneity within communities rely on 
differences of preferences across households and heterogeneity of the housing stock. We 
propose a dynamic stochastic model of location choice where households differ according to 
income only, and homes are identical within locations. Households choose whether to own or 
rent their home motivated by concerns over housing expenditure risk. The model highlights 
how differences in the timing of moves generate income heterogeneity across homeowners 
within neighborhoods, in particular in cities that experience strong positive demand shocks. 
US Census data provides evidence in favor of the income mixing mechanism we identify. In 
communities that have experienced strong price growth, the heterogeneity of homeowners’ 
incomes is positively correlated with the heterogeneity of the times since they bought their 
homes. Homeowners who moved in more recently earn higher incomes than homeowners 
who bought earlier, more so in cities with strong housing price growth. These relationships do 
not hold for renters. 
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There is considerable income heterogeneity within neighborhoods. Epple and Sieg (1999)
estimate that 89 percent of the income variance in the Boston metropolitan area in 1980
could be explained by within-community variance. Davidoﬀ (2005) ﬁnds that only 6 per-
cent of the variation of household incomes within US metropolitan areas could be explained
by diﬀerences across jurisdictions in 1990. Hardman and Ioannides (2004) report that in
1993 more than two-thirds of U.S. metropolitan neighborhoods in the American Housing
Survey included at least one household with income in the bottom quintile of the metropoli-
tan income distribution; more than half the neighborhoods had at least one household with
income in the top quintile.
Standard explanations for income mixing rely on dimensions of heterogeneity beyond
that of household income, e.g., heterogeneity of households’ place of work (Brueckner,
1994), heterogeneity of preferences for local amenities (Epple and Platt, 1998), or hetero-
geneity of the housing stock (Nechyba, 2000).
We propose an alternative explanation that is motivated by the following observation.
There are neighborhoods in central London where taxicab drivers live next to investment
bankers. The taxicab drivers’ income has not kept up with housing rents. It now takes a
banker’s income to aﬀord a home in these neighborhoods. What distinguishes the taxicab
drivers who live next to the bankers is that they bought their homes several years prior,
at a time when they were much more aﬀordable. Had these taxicab drivers chosen to rent,
they would have moved out due to the rise in rents.
This observation leads us to study a dynamic model of the housing market where house-
holds appear at diﬀerent times and choose not only where to locate but also whether to
own or rent their home. The model has two locations and two periods. The locations diﬀer
in the amenities they provide to their residents and in their housing supply elasticities.
Native households populate the model from the start. With some probability, newcomers
appear in the second period. In equilibrium, second-period housing rents in the more
desirable location depend on whether or not the city population grows.
The model features a single dimension of household heterogeneity: the size of a lump-
sum endowment that we interpret as human capital. In the second period, once the
uncertainty about the arrival of newcomers is resolved, the equilibrium problem reduces to
a standard static sorting problem ` a la Tiebout (1956) with total wealth as the one relevant
dimension of household heterogeneity. The key modeling innovation is that the mapping
from human capital to wealth for native households depends on their location and tenure
1choices the period before. For newcomers, whom we interpret to be young households who
have not accumulated any assets yet, total wealth simply coincides with human capital.
We assume that native households choose whether to own or rent a home in the ﬁrst
period motivated by concerns over housing expenditure risk. The only natives who buy a
home in the more desirable location in the ﬁrst period are those who plan to remain there
independently of the population shock. This makes their second-period wealth risky, but
perfectly insures them against the shock: wealth is higher precisely when newcomers move
in and rents rise.
For both natives and newcomers, there is a common critical level of second-period
wealth such that households with wealth above that level choose the more desirable loca-
tion, while all others choose the other location. When the arrival of newcomers generates
a suﬃciently large rent rise in the more desirable location, some native homeowners realize
capital gains that lift their wealth above the critical level even though their human capital
is below it. By contrast, the newcomers who become their neighbors all have human cap-
ital above this threshold, and so their human capital exceeds that of the poorest native
homeowners.
Thus the model delivers a very simple explanation for our observation about central
London. While the cab drivers have lower income than their banker neighbors, they
enjoyed substantial capital gains on their homes. This wealth increase let them stay in
the neighborhood despite the strong increase in the user cost of housing relative to their
incomes.
To ascertain the broader relevance of the income mixing mechanism we identify, we
turn to the 5 percent sample of the 2000 US Census. The predictions of the model are
contingent on housing price growth over the period when households move to the city.
We focus on the 1351 urban Public Use Micro Areas (PUMAs) that we can match to
metropolitan areas covered by the Freddie Mac housing price index. The housing price
data starts in 1975; as an indicator of housing price growth, we take the growth over the
period 1975-1999. We split the metropolitan areas into four quartiles according to the
price growth they experienced. This gives us four sub-samples of PUMAs diﬀerentiated
along the dimension relevant to the model.
We ﬁrst study the correlation between income heterogeneity and heterogeneity of time
since moved among homeowners. We regress income heterogeneity on heterogeneity of
time since moved and control variables that capture the heterogeneity of the age of the
heads of households and the heterogeneity of property values. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive
2correlation between heterogeneity of income and time since moved only in cities that have
experienced greater than median price growth over the period 1975-1999. We ﬁnd a larger
coeﬃcient on heterogeneity of time since moved in the sub-sample of PUMAs located in
cities that experienced price growth in the top quartile.
The relationship between heterogeneity of income and of time since moved in the model
is due to the fact that the most recent movers have higher income than their neighbors,
in cities with strong price growth. In the data, we ﬁnd that households who bought a
home more recently than their neighbors have a higher income relative to their neighbors,
holding constant the age of the head of the household and the property value. Furthermore,
the regression coeﬃcient on diﬀerences in time since moved is larger the greater the local
housing price growth over the past 25 years.
The predictions of the model concern homeowners and the capital gains they realize
on their home. Renters do not experience capital gains when housing prices grow. As
expected, we do not ﬁnd the same empirical patterns when we run the above regressions on
renters. To complement our empirical analysis, we also report evidence from the American
Housing Survey which provides data on small neighborhoods of about 10 households on
average.
We abstract from transaction costs in the model. Transactions costs would also gener-
ate hysteresis in the allocation of properties across households. Absent any wealth eﬀect,
if transaction costs were the drivers of the income heterogeneity we observe, we would ex-
pect a positive relationship between income heterogeneity and heterogeneity of time since
moved in places that experienced weak housing price growth. In places that experienced
strong housing price growth, we would expect transaction costs to be irrelevant, and hence
no relationship between income heterogeneity and heterogeneity of time since moved. This
goes counter to our empirical ﬁnding that the relationship between the heterogeneity of
homeowners’ incomes and the heterogeneity of the times since they moved is strongest in
the locations that experienced the largest price growth.
We are not the ﬁrst to study a dynamic sorting model. B´ enabou (1996a, 1996b),
Durlauf (1996) and Fernandez and Rogerson (1996, 1998) propose dynamic sorting models
to analyze macroeconomic and policy issues. They assume that the beneﬁts of living in
a community depend on the make-up of the community and are therefore determined
endogenously. The same is true in static models that determine the beneﬁts of each
community by a political equilibrium; see, for example, Epple, Filimon and Romer (1984,
1993). Common to all these models is that households make only one location decision in
3equilibrium, either by assumption or because of a focus on stationary environments. We
instead take the amenities of a community as given, but we allow households to relocate
and to choose whether to own or rent their property in the face of endogenous ﬂuctuations
in housing costs.
What distinguishes the more expensive community in our model is a combination of
greater desirability and a more inelastic housing supply. Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai (2004)
ﬁnd that the households that move to desirable cities with inelastic housing supplies tend
to be richer than the households already living in these cities. Although our discussion is
cast in terms of communities within the same urban area, our arguments seem to apply
equally to cities within a country.
As in Ortalo-Magn´ e and Rady (2002), we focus on tenure choice driven by concerns
over future housing expenditure risk. Davidoﬀ (2003), Diaz-Serrano (2005), Han (2004)
and Hilber (2005) provide evidence of the relevance of this driver of tenure choice. Our
two-period model captures the idea that, at short horizons, household concerns over period-
to-period rent risk are dominated by concerns over end-of-holding-period price risk, and
vice versa at long horizons (Sinai and Souleles, 2005). From a modeling standpoint, the
innovation in the present paper relative to this literature is that we cast such tenure
concerns within an equilibrium model of the housing market.
2 The Model
There are two periods, 1 and 2, and two communities, 0 and 1. In community 0, the supply
of homes is perfectly elastic at a constant rent normalized to zero. In community 1, there
is a measure S of identical homes owned initially by absentee landlords. For simplicity,
the landlords are assumed to be risk-neutral. They discount rents at the same exogenous
interest rate at which households can borrow and save. Without loss of generality, we
assume that this interest rate is zero.
Initially, the area is populated by a measure one of households that we call the na-
tives. Natives derive additively separable utility from the consumption of housing and a
numeraire good. There is no discounting of utility across periods. Community 1 is more
desirable than community 0: housing utility derived from a home in community 0 is nor-
malized to zero, whereas a home in community 1 yields an additive utility premium of
µ > 0 per period, whether the home is owned or rented.
4The numeraire good is enjoyed at the end of period 2 only. The utility derived from
consumption of c units of the numeraire good is described by the constant absolute risk
aversion function U(c) = −e−c where the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion is assumed to
be 1 to economize on notation. Within each period, trading takes place before consump-
tion.
There is uncertainty in period 2. With probability π ∈ (0,1), state H occurs: A
measure ν of newcomer households moves to the area at the start of period 2. With
probability 1−π, state L occurs: Nobody moves in. Although the shock is asymmetric by
design, we will see later that from the point of view of the natives, it amounts to either a
rent increase (state H), or a rent decline (state L). Our speciﬁc modelling choice for the
shock is motivated by our interest in the allocation of homes between households that had
the opportunity to buy their homes early and those who move in later.
Each native household is characterized by an endowment of W ≥ 0 units of the nu-
meraire good that we interpret as its human capital. The distribution of native households’
endowments has a strictly positive density on (0,∞). The corresponding cumulative distri-
bution function is F : [0,∞] → [0,1]. We assume perfect capital markets, so the household
faces a single budget constraint: life-time expenditures on housing and numeraire con-
sumption cannot exceed W.
The distribution of the endowments of newcomer households also has support [0,∞)
and a strictly positive density on (0,∞). The corresponding cumulative distribution func-
tion is ˜ F : [0,∞] → [0,1].
For ease of exposition, we assume S < 1
2 throughout. This limits the number of cases
we will have to consider without taking anything away from the results.
2.1 Tenure choice
Whether a household owns or rents a home in community 0, the cost is nil by assumption.
Since we also assume that housing utility does not depend on tenure, all households are
indiﬀerent between renting and owning a home in community 0.
Tenure matters for homes in community 1. We denote R1 their rent in period 1; RH
in period 2, state H; and RL in period 2, state L. We assume RL < RH throughout this
section. We will see later that this inequality holds in equilibrium.
5Arbitrage on the part of the landlords ensures that the price of a home in period 1, p1,
equals the ﬁrst-period rent plus discounted expected second-period rent:
p1 = R1 + ¯ R2 (1)
where R1 denotes the ﬁrst-period rent and ¯ R2 = π RH + (1 − π)RL the expected second-
period rent. Since period 2 is the last period of the economy, renting a home in period 2
is equivalent to buying it, so the price of a home in period 2 coincides with the rental cost
of that home in period 2.
Further notation describes location and tenure choices. A native household’s location
plan is denoted by (h1,hH,hL), where h1, hH and hL take the value of 1 for community 1,
and 0 for community 0. To indicate the tenure choice when h1 = 1, we denote the combined
location-tenure plan by (1B,hH,hL) if the household buys a home, and (1R,hH,hL) if it
rents one. Figure 1 summarizes the location-tenure choices available to a native household.
Period 1 Period 2
(Buy in 1) 1B
(Rent in 1) 1R
(Live in 0) 0
(Live in 1) 1
(Live in 0) 0
(Live in 1) 1












Figure 1: Native households’ housing choices
Natives choose among twelve location-tenure plans. There are eight location plans.
There are two alternatives for each of period 1, period 2, state H, and period 2, state L.
For the four location plans that involve living in location 1 in period 1, native households
must decide whether to buy or rent.
6The tenure choice aﬀects how shocks to the housing markets translate into shocks to
the household’s cost of housing and then through the budget constraint into shocks to non-
housing consumption. The stochastic properties of numeraire consumption are therefore
what is at issue with regard to the choice of tenure.
For example, consider the expected numeraire consumption of a household that chooses
to live in location 1 in period 1 and in period 2, whatever the shock. If the household
rents in period 1, it pays ﬁrst-period rent and then realized rent in period 2. Its expected
numeraire consumption is W − R1 − ¯ R2. If the household buys in period 1, its numeraire
consumption is W −p1. By equation (1), expected numeraire consumption is independent
of tenure choice. The same holds for every other plan that involves a tenure choice.
Because households are risk-averse, this property of expected numeraire consumption
implies that the tenure decision reduces to choosing the option that produces the smallest
absolute diﬀerence between the numeraire consumption levels in the two states of the
economy.
For the location plans with a deterministic horizon in the type 1 home, (1,0,0) and
(1,1,1), the tenure choice is obvious as one of the tenure modes provides full insurance and
the other does not. A household that rents in period 1 and moves to location 0 in period
2 does not suﬀer any shock to its consumption of numeraire. A household that buys in
period 1 and remains in location 1 in period 2 does not face any numeraire consumption
risk either. The plans (1R,0,0) and (1B,1,1) therefore dominate the plans (1B,0,0) and
(1R,1,1), respectively.
Under the location plans (1,1,0) and (1,0,1), however, either tenure mode imposes
some risk on the household. Under (1,1,0), if the household rents, it pays the rent RH in
state H and no rent in state L; its numeraire consumption is lower by RH in state H than
in state L. If the household buys in the ﬁrst period, it sells the home if the state L occurs.
The price of a location 1 home in state L is RL. The household’s numeraire consumption
is therefore lower by RL in state H than in state L if it buys in period 1. Buying is thus
less risky, given our working assumption that RL is lower than RH. The location-tenure
plan (1B,1,0) therefore dominates the plan (1R,1,0). Under (1,0,1), the logic is reversed:
the location-tenure plan (1R,0,1) dominates the plan (1B,0,1).
We summarize these ﬁndings in
Lemma 1 If RL < RH, a native household wanting to live in location 1 in the ﬁrst period
prefers to own its home if and only if it plans to stay in location 1 should state H occur
in the second period.
72.2 Location choice
We are left with eight plans to consider: (0,0,0), (0,0,1), (0,1,0), (0,1,1), (1R,0,0),
(1R,0,1), (1B,1,0), and (1B,1,1). Each of these plans determines a curve in the plane with
coordinates W (the household’s endowment) and EU (the expected overall utility level).
Determining the optimal plan for every W amounts to characterizing the upper envelope
of the expected utility curves. In the discussion, we maintain our working assumption that
RL < RH.
First, the CARA speciﬁcation of non-housing utility implies that the expected utility of
any location-tenure plan can be written as EU = −Ae−W +B with plan-speciﬁc constants
A > 0 and B ≥ 0, where B ∈ {0, πµ, (1−π)µ, µ, (1+π)µ, (2−π)µ, 2µ} is the expected




It is easy to check that if the expected utility curves of two plans cross, the curve associated
with the plan that promises a longer expected time in community 1 (and so has the higher
B) is steeper at all endowment levels (has the greater A). Note also that the higher B,
the greater the expected utility as W increases (the limit of EU as W tends to inﬁnity is
B). This immediately yields
Lemma 2 The amount of housing a native household expects to consume in community
1 increases weakly with the household’s endowment.
Second, using CARA utility, it is easy to verify that the preference ranking of the
plans (1R,0,0) and (0,1,1) does not depend on the household’s endowment. In other
words, the expected utility curves associated with these two plans are either identical or
do not intersect. Both plans generate the same utility of housing, µ; their ranking is
determined by the cost diﬀerence alone. We thus have
Lemma 3 The plan (1R,0,0) weakly dominates (0,1,1) if and only if
e
R1 ≤ πe
RH + (1 − π)e
RL, (2)
with a strict preference if the inequality is strict.
Third, we ﬁnd that the plans (0,1,0) and (1B,1,0) are not chosen by any native
household. This yields
8Lemma 4 If RL < RH, each native household chooses one of the location-tenure plans
(0,0,0), (0,0,1), (0,1,1), (1R,0,0), (1R,0,1) and (1B,1,1).
To see this, note that the location choice in period 2 obeys a simple cutoﬀ rule in terms
of period 2 wealth, W ′, which is the endowment minus the cost of housing consumed in
period 1. In state s ∈ {H,L}, a household with wealth W ′ strictly prefers location 1 if
and only if W ′ > W ′











Rs − 1. (4)
If RL < RH, then W ′
L < W ′
H.
Households that spend period 1 in location 0 have the same wealth at the start of
period 2 in either state. If this wealth is such that they choose location 1 in state H, they
obviously also choose location 1 in state L. This rules out the plan (0,1,0).
Households that buy a location 1 home in period 1 enjoy gains or losses depending
on the state in period 2. The diﬀerence between the corresponding second-period wealth

























= RH − RL (5)
by the concavity of the logarithm, the inequality W ′ > W ′
H implies W ′ > W ′
L. This rules
out the plan (1B,1,0).
The newcomers appear in the second period only if state H occurs. Any newcomer
with endowment above W ′
H chooses location 1, all others choose location 0.
2.3 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a triple of rents, (R1,RH,RL), and a period 1 price, p1, for homes in
community 1, together with a location-tenure plan for each native household and a location
choice for each newcomer. The equilibrium price of homes in community 1 must be such
that landlords are indiﬀerent between selling a home in period 1 and renting it in both
periods at the equilibrium rents. The equilibrium allocation must be such that housing
9markets clear and each household’s utility is maximized, given its budget constraint and
the prices and rents of homes in community 1.
Proposition 1 There is a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium rents satisfy RL < R1 <
RH. There is a unique size ν∗ > 0 of the newcomer cohort such that condition (2) holds
as an equality for all ν ≤ ν∗, and as a strict inequality for all ν > ν∗. Native households’
equilibrium choices are characterized by critical endowment levels 0 < W1 < W2 < W3 <
W4 such that
• all native households with endowment smaller than W1 choose (0,0,0);
• all native households with endowment between W1 and W2 choose (0,0,1);
• if (2) holds as a strict inequality, all native households with endowment between W2
and W3 choose (1R,0,0);
• if (2) holds as an equality, more than half of all native households with endowment
between W2 and W3 choose (1R,0,0), and the rest (0,1,1);
• all native households with endowment between W3 and W4 choose (1R,0,1);
• all native households with endowment greater than W4 choose (1B,1,1).
All newcomers with endowment greater than W ′
H choose community 1 in state H, all others
community 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.1. The formulas for the endowment cutoﬀs are given in Appendix
A.4.
The inequality RL < RH reﬂects the price pressure newcomers exert when they appear
in state H. That the opportunity cost of choosing community 1 in the ﬁrst period, R1,
lies strictly in between RL and RH is then dictated by market clearing. Intuitively, the
cost of living in community 1 in period 1 cannot be too diﬀerent from the cost of living in
community 1 in period 2 for sure, a cost that lies in between RL and RH.
How much price pressure newcomers exert depends on the size of their cohort, ν. If
it is large enough, location 1 is suﬃciently expensive in state H for the plan (1R,0,0) to
strictly dominate (0,1,1).
Figure 2 summarizes native households’ choices in equilibrium for this case and graphs
the mapping from endowments to second-period wealth. A household’s endowment, W,














Figure 2: Equilibrium location choices and second-period wealth of native households
W ′, is on the vertical axis; it equals W minus the cost of housing consumed in period 1.
Up to W = W2, W ′ equals W. From W = W2 to W3, W ′ equals W minus ﬁrst-period rent
R1 for those households that choose (1R,0,0), and W for those that choose (0,1,1). From
W = W3 to W4, W ′ equals W minus ﬁrst-period rent. For W above W4, W ′ depends on
the realization of the shock. In state H, W ′ = W −p1+RH; in state L, W ′ = W −p1+RL.
The ﬁgure also shows the critical wealth levels W ′
H and W ′
L that determine second-
period location choice. By time consistency, the second-period wealth of the poorest native
households that follow plan (1B,1,1) must be at least W ′
H in state H. In fact, we have
the strict inequality W4 −p1 +RH > W ′
H. To prove it, suppose that W4 −p1 +RH = W ′
H.
The households with endowment W4 are then indiﬀerent between the plans (1B,0,1) and
(1B,1,1). However, we know from Lemma 1 that the plan (1R,0,1) dominates the plan
(1B,0,1). This is inconsistent with the deﬁnition of W4.
11Similarly, by time consistency, the second-period wealth of the poorest native house-
holds that follow plan (1B,1,1) must be at least W ′
L in state L. Again, we have the strict
inequality W4−p1+RL > W ′
L. To prove it, suppose that W4−p1+RL = W ′
L. The house-
holds with endowment W4 are then indiﬀerent between the plans (1B,1,0) and (1B,1,1).
However, Lemma 4 implies that households that are indiﬀerent between the plans (1B,1,0)
and (1B,1,1) strictly prefer the plan (1R,0,1) to the plan (1B,1,1). This is inconsistent
with the deﬁnition of W4.
The second-period wealth of the poorest native households that buy a location 1 home
in period 1 is thus strictly larger than the endowment of the poorest newcomers who move
to location 1 in both states H.
When the wealth of the poorest natives who buy in location 1 is boosted by suﬃciently
large capital gains RH − p1 on location 1 homes, their endowment can still be strictly
smaller than the endowment of these newcomers. This is the situation depicted in Figure
2. We ﬁnd that it arises if the price pressure from newcomers is suﬃciently large.
Proposition 2 There is a ν∗∗ > 0 such that for all ν ≥ ν∗∗, the endowment of the poorest
native households that buy a location 1 home in period 1 is smaller than the endowment
of the poorest newcomers that move to location 1 in state H; i.e., W4 < W ′
H.
Proof: See Appendix A.5.
Proposition 2 allow us to rationalize our observation about central London. The taxi-
cab drivers moved in when housing prices were low relative to their income. By buying
their home, they insured themselves against their income not growing as fast as rents.
Subsequently, they enjoyed capital gains large enough to more than compensate their in-
come disadvantage relative to their new neighbors. The wealth of the newcomers, who are
young, is primarily their human capital. Moving next to the old taxicab drivers requires
substantial earning power. This is why the young people who move next to the old taxicab
drivers are investment bankers and not young university professors.1
3 Empirical Evidence
The model yields predictions with regards to households’ location and tenure choices as
a function of their human capital. In communities that experienced strong price growth,
1Both authors struggled to ﬁnd housing in central London at the start of their academic career.
12the model predicts a positive correlation between the heterogeneity of homeowners’ human
capital and the heterogeneity of the time since they moved in.
To what extent is this relevant for income mixing? To answer this question, we turn
to the household data from the 2000 5% Census sample (Ruggles et al., 2004). To identify
locations, we use the smallest geographic unit that is identiﬁable in this data set, the
Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA).
The predictions of the model depend on the extent to which housing prices have grown
over the period during which homeowners moved into their community. Freddie Mac has
been publishing a quality adjusted housing price index for US metropolitan areas since
1975. For the purpose of our study, we compute real housing price growth between the
ﬁrst quarter of 1975 and the fourth quarter of 1999. As a price deﬂator, we use the CPI-US
index for all urban consumers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
We are able to match 1351 PUMAs to the metropolitan housing price data. There are
between 82 and 4467 homeowner households within each PUMA with a median of 1060
households per PUMA. We group the PUMAs into four quartiles according to their price
growth experience. The price growth cutoﬀ points are 4.2%, 19.5% and 58.2%. The highest
price growth in the sample was 188% for a PUMA located in San Jose, CA. Appendix A.6
reports deﬁnitions of the variables we use and summary statistics.
If our theoretical ﬁndings are relevant for income mixing within community, we should
ﬁnd a positive correlation between income heterogeneity and heterogeneity of time since
moved in places that have experienced strong price growth. We measure income hetero-
geneity with the coeﬃcient of variation of income in order to take out mean eﬀects. From
a theoretical point of view, it makes no diﬀerence whether households moved in 1 and 2
years ago or 11 and 12 years ago. We therefore use the standard deviation to measure the
heterogeneity of the time since households moved to the neighborhood.
We control for two additional factors. First, income heterogeneity may arise as a
function of time since moved simply because people who moved in at diﬀerent times do
not have the same age. This would arise for example in a world where everyone has same
human capital, buys a home at 25, and income increases with age. We therefore control
for the standard deviation of the age of the head of household. Second, communities
with more heterogeneous properties are likely to house more heterogeneous households.
We therefore control for the coeﬃcient of variation of property values. We choose the
coeﬃcient of variation in order to be consistent with our measure of income heterogeneity.






PUMAs quartile quartile quartile quartile
S.D. time since moved −0.0046 −0.0116 0.0095 0.0184
(0.0026) (0.0043)∗ (0.0040)∗ (0.0045)∗
S.D. age head 0.0237 0.0295 0.0184 0.0150
(0.0033)∗ (0.0049)∗ (0.0041)∗ (0.0044)∗
C.V. home value 0.4549 0.4044 0.4127 0.4466
(0.0277)∗ (0.0271)∗ (0.0267)∗ (0.0354)∗
Intercept 0.2097 0.2429 0.1824 0.1510
(0.0466)∗ (0.0529)∗ (0.0453)∗ (0.0599)∗
R2 0.56 0.54 0.54 0.45
∗Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level.
Table 1 presents the results.2 The relationship between income heterogeneity and
heterogeneity of time since moved is negative for PUMAs located in cities with below
median price growth. It is positive and signiﬁcant for PUMAs located in cities with above
median price growth. The coeﬃcient estimated for PUMAs in the top price growth quartile
is almost twice that for PUMAs in the second quartile. The greater the heterogeneity of
the age of heads of households, the greater the income heterogeneity. The greater the
heterogeneity of property values, the greater the income heterogeneity.
The relationship between income heterogeneity and time-since-moved heterogeneity in
the model is due to the fact that in markets with strong housing price growth, homeowners
who moved in more recently have higher human capital than homeowners who moved in
earlier. To check whether the same relationship holds in the data, we regress relative
household income on the relative time since the household moved to the PUMA. We
compute a household’s relative income as the ratio of its income to the median household
income for all homeowners who live in the same community. We compute a household’s
relative time since moved as the diﬀerence between the time since the household bought
its current home and the median time since homeowner households bought their current
home in the community. Again, we control for age diﬀerences by including as covariates the
diﬀerence between the age of the head of the household and the median age of household
2Standard errors are in parentheses in this and all subsequent tables where relevant.
14heads for the community. We also control for diﬀerences in property value by including
the ratio of the value of the household’s property to the median property value in the
community. We compute robust standard errors, accounting for the clustering at the
PUMA level.






PUMAs quartile quartile quartile quartile
Time since moved −.0011 −.0021 −.0023 −.0056
(.0002)∗ (.0002)∗ (.0002)∗ (.0003)∗
Age household head −.0074 −.0079 −.0082 −.0084
(.0002)∗ (.0001)∗ (.0002)∗ (.0002)∗
Home value .4924 .5112 .5349 .6367
(.0077)∗ (.0107)∗ (.0105)∗ (.0134)∗
Intercept .6750 .6524 .6328 .5667
(.0080)∗ (.0109)∗ (.0106)∗ (.0118)∗
R2 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.18
∗Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level.
The regression results reported in Table 2 indicate that households who moved in
more recently tend to have a higher income than households who moved in earlier. The
coeﬃcient on relative time since moved is larger in communities located in metropolitan
areas that have experienced the strongest price growth. Households younger than their
neighbors tend to have greater income. Households who own a more valuable property
also tend to have greater income.
The Census data indicates a positive relationship between the heterogeneity of home-
owners’ income and the heterogeneity of the time since they bought their home when the
community is located in a city that has experienced strong price growth. The rationaliza-
tion for this fact that is oﬀered by the model is not rejected by the data: we ﬁnd evidence
that homeowners who moved in more recently have greater income than their neighbors,
again more so in communities that have experienced strong price growth.
The predictions of the model concern homeowners, not renters. As a further check
on the mechanism that generates income heterogeneity in the model, we replicate the
above regressions for renters. We recompute the same income, time since moved and age
15measures for renters within each PUMA. We replace the coeﬃcient of variation of property
values and the relative property value with the coeﬃcient of variation of gross monthly
rents and relative gross monthly rent.






PUMAs quartile quartile quartile quartile
S.D. time since moved 0.0328 0.0213 0.0366 0.0337
(0.0067)∗ (0.0080)∗ (0.0040)∗ (0.0075)∗
S.D. age head −0.0095 −0.0162 −0.0032 −0.0130
(0.0041)∗ (0.0050)∗ (0.0044) (0.0059)∗
C.V. gross rent 0.3551 0.7928 0.3941 0.3249
(0.1030)∗ (0.1181)∗ (0.0838)∗ (0.1277)∗
Intercept 0.7654 0.7094 0.5711 0.7932
(0.0664)∗ (0.0815)∗ (0.0741)∗ (0.0816)∗
R2 0.20 0.20 0.34 0.20
∗Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level.
The results we obtain for the heterogeneity of income are reported in Table 3. We
ﬁnd a positive relationship between income heterogeneity and heterogeneity in the time
since moved. However, the coeﬃcients that we estimate are similar across all sub-samples.
Diﬀerences in local housing price growth do not seem to aﬀect the correlation between the
heterogeneity of renters’ incomes and that of time since moved.
Contrary to what we obtained for owners, Table 4 shows a positive relationship between
diﬀerences in time since moved and relative income for renters. The renters who moved
in more recently tend to have lower income than the renters who moved in earlier, ceteris
paribus. Again, estimates for renters do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly across the four sub-samples.
PUMAs are large communities with the advantage of containing suﬃciently many
households for us to study the relationship between relative income and time since moved.
Moreover, they are suﬃciently large for metropolitan area housing prices to provide a good
indicator of price growth over the long period we focused on.
The neighborhood cluster samples of the American Housing Survey (AHS) oﬀer an
opportunity to examine the relationship between the heterogeneity of incomes and of time
since moved at a much lower level of aggregation. For a description and detailed analysis






PUMAs quartile quartile quartile quartile
Time since moved .0104 .0114 .0113 .0099
(.0006)∗ (.0005)∗ (.0006)∗ (.0006)∗
Age household head −.0033 −.0051 −.0062 −.0055
(.0003)∗ (.0003)∗ (.0003) (.0003)∗
Gross rent .7139 .7060 .7840 .8361
(.0155)∗ (.0257)∗ (.0186)∗ (.0207)∗
Intercept .5462 .5622 .4951 .4133
(.0154)∗ (.0232)∗ (.0173)∗ (.0186)∗
R2 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.11
∗Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level.
of this survey data, see Ioannides (2004), who ﬁnds in particular that the coeﬃcient of
variation in neighborhood incomes increases with the mean time since moved. When
we regress the coeﬃcient of variation of incomes in AHS neighborhoods on the standard
deviation of time since moved, the standard deviation of the age of heads of households
and the coeﬃcient of variation of property values, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient
on the standard deviation of time since moved for homeowners. For renters, this coeﬃcient
is not signiﬁcant.3
4 Concluding Remarks
The empirical literature concerned with housing and location choices has ﬂourished re-
cently thanks to econometric advances that enable researchers to estimate households’
preferences and willingness to pay for various amenities, the returns to educational expen-
ditures, the beneﬁts of social interactions and peer eﬀects; e.g., Bajari and Kahn (2005),
Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2003), Bayer, Ross and Topa (2005), Calabrese et al. (forth-
coming), Sieg et al. (2004).
3The results are available from the authors on request. Owing to lack of data, we cannot control for
the heterogeneity of rents in the regression for renters. The AHS data samples are too small to replicate
the other regressions we carry out on the Census data, especially once we exclude neighborhoods for which
we do not have metropolitan area price data.
17Data requirements with regards to housing consumption restrict these studies to cross-
sectional data sets with no ability to track households over time. These data sets provide
household income but not household wealth. This is the case with the widely used Census
data, for example.
As a result, it is common for researchers to approach the data through the lens of a
static model of housing choice constrained by income. But a household’s housing choice
is the outcome of a dynamic optimization constrained by wealth, not income. The typical
empirical approach therefore suﬀers from the fact that income is a poor predictor of a
household’s wealth; e.g., Kennickell (1999).
This paper oﬀers a partial remedy. We show that people who moved in at diﬀerent
times are likely to have diﬀerent wealth even if they have the same income, in particular
if they own their home and their location has a history of strong housing price growth.
Some researchers restrict their samples to recent movers, usually motivated by concerns
on housing consumption hysteresis because of moving costs. At the very least, our ﬁndings
provide an additional justiﬁcation for such a sample restriction.
More generally, our ﬁndings should encourage researchers to study the predictive power
of diﬀerences in tenure choice and in time since moved. This information may help re-
searchers to disentangle the contribution of wealth heterogeneity to observed housing and
location choices from the contribution of preference heterogeneity. This point is partic-
ularly relevant for the numerous studies that focus on coastal metropolitan areas (e.g.,
Boston, Los Angeles, San Francisco). Our empirical ﬁndings indicate that time since
moved is particularly informative in cities with a history of strong housing price growth.
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21Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof draws on auxiliary results that are established in Sections A.2–A.4 of this appendix. Lemma
A.4 shows that in equilibrium, second period rents satisfy RL < RH. Lemma A.5 shows that (2) holds.
Lemma A.6 shows that the equilibrium conﬁguration must be as stated in the proposition. This implies
that the relevant market clearing conditions are (A.10)–(A.13). Lemma A.7 shows that these conditions
are equivalent to the system of equations (A.14)–(A.17). Lemmas A.8 and A.9 show that this system
admits a unique solution. Lemma A.10 shows that this solution yields an equilibrium. Lemma A.11 shows
the existence of ν∗.
A.2 Auxiliary results on household behavior
To ease the notational burden, we deﬁne
e1 = e(1+r)R1, eH = eRH, eL = eRL, e2 = e
¯ R2. (A.1)
Lemma A.1 Let RL < RH. Then:
(i) the plan (1R,0,1) is preferred over both (1R,0,0) and (1B,1,1) at all endowments in some set of
positive measure;
(ii) at least one of the plans (0,0,1) and (1R,0,0) is preferred over both (0,0,0) and (1R,0,1) at all
endowments in some set of positive measure;
(iii) the plan (0,0,1) is preferred over both (0,0,0) and (0,1,1) at all endowments in some set of positive
measure.
Proof: Part (i): Let W∗ be the endowment at which a native household would be indiﬀerent between
the plans (1R,0,0) and (1B,1,1), and W† the endowment at which it would be indiﬀerent between the
plans (1R,0,1) and (1B,1,1). To show that the plan (1R,0,1) is preferred to both (1R,0,0) and (1B,1,1)
on a set of endowment levels of positive measure, it is enough to show that W∗ < W†. To see this, recall
from Section 2.1 that if the expected utility curves of two plans cross, the curve associated with the plan
that promises a larger amount of housing consumption in location 1 ex ante is steeper at all endowment
levels. The curve associated with (1R,0,1) is above the curve associated with (1B,1,1) to the left of W†,
and the latter is above the curve associated with (1R,0,0) to the right of W∗. If W∗ < W†, therefore,
(1R,0,1) is preferred to both (1R,0,0) and (1B,1,1) at all endowments strictly between W∗ and W†.
It is straightforward to verify that the endowments W∗ and W† are deﬁned by
µeW∗ = e1 (e2 − 1), (A.2)
µeW† = e1
 






The inequality W∗ < W† is easily seen to be equivalent to eL < e2, which in turn is the same as eL < eH.
Part (ii): An argument similar to the one used for part (i) shows ﬁrst that for e1 ≤ eL, (1R,0,0) is
preferred to (0,0,0) and (1R,0,1) on some open interval of endowments; and second, that for e1 ≥ eL,
(0,0,1) is preferred to (0,0,0) and (1R,0,1) on some open interval of endowments.
Part (iii): Let W# be the endowment level at which a native household would be indiﬀerent between
the plans (0,0,0) and (0,1,1), and W♭ the endowment level at which it would be indiﬀerent between the
plans (0,0,1) and (0,1,1):
µeW# = πeH + (1 − π)eL − 1, (A.4)
µeW♭ = eH − 1. (A.5)
It suﬃces to show that W# < W♭. This is easily seen to be equivalent to eL < eH.
22If RL > RH, the roles of the two states in period 2 are reversed. The following result is therefore just
a mirror image of Lemma 4 and does not require proof.
Lemma A.2 If RL > RH, each native household chooses one of the plans (0,0,0), (0,1,0), (0,1,1),
(1R,0,0), (1R,1,0) and (1B,1,1).
If RH = RL, the tenure mode is irrelevant, so native households’ decisions concern location only.
Lemma A.3 If RL = RH, only the location plans (0,0,0), (0,1,1), (1,0,0) and (1,1,1) may be chosen
by a positive measure of native households.
Proof: If RL = RH, the wealth cutoﬀs that determine second-period location choice satisfy W ′
L = W′
H.
The result thus follows by backward induction.
A.3 Auxiliary results on equilibrium prices and conﬁgurations
In the following, we shall write D1, DH, and DL for native households’ aggregate demand for location 1
housing in period 1, period 2 state H and period 2 state L, respectively.
Lemma A.4 In equilibrium, second-period rents satisfy RL < RH.
Proof: Suppose that RL ≥ RH. Then, Lemmas A.2 and A.3 imply that DL ≤ DH. In state H, a
positive measure of newcomers demand housing in location 1. So total demand for housing in location 1
is strictly higher in state H than in state L. Given that the supply of housing in location 1 is the same in
both states, this is incompatible with market clearing.
Lemma A.5 In equilibrium, the measure of native households that choose the plan (1R,0,0) is larger
than the measure of native households that choose the plan (0,1,1). As a consequence, (0,1,1) cannot
dominate (1R,0,0), so (2) holds.
Proof: If it were otherwise, Lemmas A.4 and 4 would imply D1 < DL, which is incompatible with
market clearing.
Lemma A.6 In equilibrium, the location-tenure plans chosen by positive measures of native households
are (0,0,0), (0,0,1), (1R,0,0), (1R,0,1) and (1B,1,1) plus possibly (0,1,1).
Proof: From Lemma A.4, we know that RL < RH. From Lemma 4, we know that the only plans
that may be chosen by a positive measure of native households are (0,0,0), (0,0,1), (0,1,1), (1R,0,0),
(1R,0,1) and (1B,1,1). As the endowment distribution for native households has support [0,∞), we know
that (1B,1,1) is chosen. (Here and in what follows, we interpret the word “chosen” to mean “chosen by
a positive measure of native households.”)
First, suppose (0,0,0) is not chosen. Then, market clearing in period 1 implies m001 + m011 = 1 − S
where m001 denotes the measure of native households choosing (0,0,1), and m011 the measure of native
households choosing (0,1,1). Market clearing in period 2 state L implies that the measure of native
households choosing (1R,0,0) is m100 = 1 − S. Adding these two equations yields m001 + m011 + m100 =
2(1 − S) > 1, which contradicts the fact that the total native population has size 1.
Second, suppose that (1R,0,1) is not chosen. By part (i) of Lemma A.1, (1R,0,0) is then not chosen
either. By Lemma A.5, the same is true for (0,1,1). Once these plans are eliminated, however, one either
has D1 = DH < DL or D1 = DH = DL depending on whether (0,0,1) is chosen or not. Both cases are
incompatible with market clearing, which requires D1 = DL > DH. So (1R,0,1) must be chosen.
Third, suppose that (1R,0,0), and hence (0,1,1), is not chosen. By part (ii) of Lemma A.1, (0,0,1)
is then chosen. However, this implies D1 < DL, which is again incompatible with market clearing. So
(1R,0,0) must be chosen.
Finally, suppose that (0,0,1) is not chosen. By part (iii) of Lemma A.1, (0,1,1) is then not chosen
either. But then D1 > DL, again in contradiction to market clearing. So (0,0,1) must be chosen.
23A.4 Auxiliary results on equilibrium existence and uniqueness
Four critical endowment levels fully characterize native households’ equilibrium choices. For indiﬀerence
between (0,0,0) and (0,0,1), the critical endowment level is W1 with
µeW1 = eL − 1. (A.6)
For indiﬀerence between (0,0,1) and (1R,0,0), the critical endowment level is W2 with
µeW2 = [e1 − π − (1 − π)eL]/π. (A.7)
For indiﬀerence between (1R,0,0) and (1R,0,1), the critical endowment level is W3 with
µeW3 = e1 (eL − 1). (A.8)
For indiﬀerence between (1R,0,1) and (1B,1,1), the critical endowment level is W4 with
µeW4 = [e1 (e2 − π − (1 − π)eL)]/π. (A.9)
Clearly, W1 = W′
L and W3 = W′
L+R1. Given our results on the set of possible equilibrium conﬁgurations,
these critical endowment levels satisfy 0 < W1 < W2 < W3 < W4.
For k = 1,...,4, we let ik = F(Wk) denote the measure of native households with endowments lower
than Wk. Thus, 0 < i1 < i2 < i3 < i4 < 1. For the newcomers, n1 = ˜ F(W′
H) denotes the measure of
newcomer households with wealth lower than W′
H; it satisﬁes 0 < n1 < 1. With this notation, the market
clearing conditions for location 1 housing in period 1, period 2 state H and period 2 state L take the form
S = 1 − i3 + ρ(i3 − i2), (A.10)
S = 1 − i4 + (1 − ρ)(i3 − i2) + (1 − n1)ν, (A.11)
S = 1 − i3 + (1 − ρ)(i3 − i2) + i2 − i1, (A.12)
where ρ is the fraction of native households with endowments between W2 and W3 that choose (1R,0,0).
By Lemma A.5, we have 1
2 < ρ ≤ 1 and (2). Moreover, Lemma 3 implies that
(1 − ρ)[e1 − πeH − (1 − π)eL] = 0. (A.13)
We write W1−S for the (1 − S)-quantile of the endowment distribution of native households; that is,
F(W1−S) = 1 − S. We set ψ = µeW1−S + 1.
Lemma A.7 The system of equations (A.10)–(A.13) is equivalent to the system of equations
2(1 − S) = i1 + i3, (A.14)
2(1 − S) + ν = i2 + i4 + νn1, (A.15)
e1 = π min{eH,ψ} + (1 − π)eL, (A.16)
and
ρ =
i3 − (1 − S)
i3 − i2
. (A.17)
Proof: Adding equations (A.10) and (A.11), we obtain (A.15). Adding equations (A.10) and (A.12),
we obtain (A.14). Now, if e1 < πeH + (1 − π)eL then ρ = 1 by (A.13). Equation (A.10) then implies
i2 = 1 − S and W2 = W1−S, which by the deﬁnition of W2 yields
e1 = πψ + (1 − π)eL < πeH + (1 − π)eL. (A.18)
24If e1 = πeH + (1 − π)eL then ρ ≤ 1 and the deﬁnition of W2 becomes µeW2 = eH − 1. Moreover, (A.10)
implies i2 ≤ 1 − S, hence W2 ≤ W1−S and eH ≤ ψ. Therefore:
e1 = πeH + (1 − π)eL ≤ πψ + (1 − π)eL. (A.19)
So equation (A.16) holds. Finally, rearranging (A.10) yields (A.17).
Conversely, equation (A.16) gives us two possible cases. First, if ψ < eH, then (A.16) plus the
deﬁnitions of W2 and i2 imply i2 = 1 − S, which yields ρ = 1 by equation (A.17) and implies that
equations (A.10) and (A.13) hold. Then, replacing one term 1 − S by i2 in equations (A.15) and (A.14)
yields equations (A.11) and (A.12) for the case ρ = 1. Second, if ψ ≥ eH, then (A.16) implies that (A.13)
holds. Using (A.17) to replace one term 1−S in equations (A.15) and (A.14) yields equations (A.11) and
(A.12). Rearranging (A.17) yields (A.10).
For our next result, deﬁne e > 1 as the unique real number satisfying the equality













It is straightforward to see that 1 < e < ψ. We write W1−2S for the (1 − 2S)-quantile of the endowment
distribution of native households and set φ = µeW1−2S + 1.
Lemma A.8 Equations (A.14) and (A.16) yield e1 and eL as continuous functions of eH on [1,∞[. For
eH < ψ, e1 is strictly increasing and eL strictly decreasing in eH, with eL = e1 = eH if and only if
eH = e, and φ < eL < e < e1 < eH if e < eH < ψ. For eH ≥ ψ, e1 and eL do not vary with eH, and
φ < eL < e1 < ψ.
Proof: By the deﬁnitions of i1 and i3, the right-hand side of (A.14) is strictly increasing in eL and
e1. Equation (A.14) thus deﬁnes eL as a strictly decreasing function of e1 which assumes the value ψ at
e1 = 1 and tends to φ as e1 goes to inﬁnity. Rearranging equation (A.16) into
(1 − π)eL = e1 − π min{eH, ψ} (A.21)
deﬁnes eL as a strictly increasing function of e1, given eH. This function assumes a value strictly below 1
at e1 = 1 and tends to inﬁnity as e1 does. This implies that for any given eH, (A.14) and (A.16) determine
unique values of e1 and eL with φ < eL < ψ. When eH < ψ, an increase in eH shifts the second function
down and leaves the ﬁrst unchanged; when eH ≥ ψ, an increase in eH leaves both functions unchanged.
Continuity is obvious.
Next, note that in the (e1,eL)-plane, the graph of the function deﬁned by (A.21) cuts the 45 degree
line from below at e1 = min{eH, ψ}, while the graph of the function deﬁned by (A.14) cuts the 45 degree
line from above at e1 = e. Using these facts, it is easy to verify the statements about the ranking of e1,
eH and eL.
Lemma A.9 The system of equations (A.14)–(A.16) has a unique solution (e1,eH,eL) in [1,∞[3. This
solution satisﬁes eH > e and eL < e1 < eH. Moreover, eH is strictly increasing in ν with eH → e as
ν → 0, and eH → ∞ as ν → ∞.
Proof: We want to to establish that equation (A.15) admits a unique solution eH once e1 and eL are
solved for as functions of eH according to Lemma A.8. First, we note that i2 is strictly increasing in e1 and
strictly decreasing in eL. This implies that i2 is weakly increasing in eH. Second, n1 is strictly increasing
in eH. Third, the deﬁnition of W4 can be rearranged into
µeW4 = e1eL − e1 + e1eLz, (A.22)
where z = [(eH/eL)π − 1]/π is strictly increasing in eH and non-negative when eH ≥ e. Note that
e1eL − e1 = µeW3, which is weakly increasing in eH by equation (A.14) and the fact that i1 is weakly
decreasing in eH. As e1 is weakly increasing in eH, the product e1eL on its own is weakly increasing. So
25i4 is strictly increasing in eH. This establishes that the right-hand side of (A.15) is strictly increasing in
eH.
At eH = e, we have i2 = i1 and i4 = i3, so (A.14) implies that the right-hand side of (A.15) is smaller
than the left-hand side. For eH ≥ ψ, equation (A.16) and the deﬁnition of i2 imply that i2 = 1 − S.
As eH tends to ∞, the right-hand side of (A.15) therefore converges to 2 − S + ν which is greater than
the left-hand side. This establishes existence and uniqueness of a solution to the system of equations
(A.14)–(A.16) with the stated properties.
As n1 < 1, raising ν makes the left-hand side of (A.15) exceed the right-hand side. As the latter is
strictly increasing in eH once e1 and eL are solved for as functions of this variable, we have the claimed
comparative statics and asymptotics for eH.
Lemma A.10 The solution to the system of equations (A.14)–(A.16) identiﬁed in Lemma A.9 constitutes
an equilibrium.
Proof: Lemma A.8 implies that 0 < i1 < i2 < i3 < i4. Thus, the ranking of the measures i1 through i4
is the one that we assumed when formulating the market clearing conditions (A.10)–(A.13). The solution
we have identiﬁed thus constitutes an equilibrium.
Lemma A.11 There is a unique ν∗ > 0 such that condition (2) holds as an equality for all ν ≤ ν∗, and
as a strict inequality for all ν > ν∗.
Proof: By the last part of Lemma A.9, there is a unique ν such that eH = ψ; call this ν∗. The result
then follows from equation (A.16).
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2





e1 [e2 − π − (1 − π)eL]
π(eH − 1)
. (A.23)
For ν ≥ ν∗, e1 and eL are independent of eH by Lemma A.8. Using the fact that e2 = eπ
He
1−π
L , we ﬁnd
that the derivative of the right-hand side of (A.23) with respect to eH is
−
e1 [π(e2 − 1) + (1 − π)(e2 − eL)]
π(eH − 1)2 , (A.24)
hence strictly negative and bounded away from zero. By the last part of Lemma A.9, there are thus two
cases. Either W4 − W′
H < 0 at ν = ν∗ and we can take ν∗∗ = ν∗; or W4 − W′
H ≥ 0 at ν = ν∗ and there is
a ν∗∗ > ν∗ with the stated property.
26A.6 Data sources and summary statistics
Real housing prices are built from the MSA Conventional Mortgage Home Price Index produced by the
Oﬃce of the Chief Economist at Freddie Mac. To obtain real housing prices, we use the CPI-US index
(series cuur0000sa0) from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics.
We build all other variables from the Census data provided at www.ipums.org. The website provides
detailed deﬁnitions for each variable. For each household in the sample, we download household income
(HHINCOME), tenure (OWNERSHP), home value (VALUEH), gross monthly rent (RENTGRS) and
location indicators (PUMA, STATEFIP, METAREA). The census questionnaire in 2000 did not ask
households to explicitly identify the head of household. To compute the age of the head of household, we
download the age of each person in the household (AGE) and its wage income (INCWAGE). We deﬁne
the age of the head of household as the age of the person with the highest wage income in the household.
If no person receives a wage in the household, we take the age of the oldest person in the household. To
determine the number of years since the household moved into its current home, we use the number of
years since our deﬁned head of household moved into residence (MOVEDIN). The variables VALUEH and
INCWAGE are coded in intervals. We replace each interval code with the median value of the interval.
We restrict the sample to households that live in the 1351 PUMAs located in one of the 164 MSAs
for which we have real housing prices. We end up with 2,035,611 households that own their home and
1,084,878 households that rent their home.
We group PUMAs according to the housing price growth in the MSA where they are located. The
groups vary in size because we have more than one PUMA for most MSAs (between 1 and 67 PUMAs,
with a median of 4). Each group is computed including PUMAs with growth strictly greater than the
low cutoﬀ value and less than or equal to the high cutoﬀ value. Note that the results we report are not
sensitive to changes in the grouping rule.
Table 5 reports summary statistics at the PUMA level computed over owners and renters separately.
Table 6 reports summary statistics at the household level where again households are grouped accord-
ing to the same PUMA groups as above. Recall that relative income, relative home value and relative
gross rents are computed as ratios to the median of the PUMA. For time since moved and age, we use the
diﬀerence between the value of the head of the household and the median of the PUMA.






PUMAs quartile quartile quartile quartile
Number of PUMAs 349 327 398 277
——— Homeowners ———
Mean C.V. household income 0.8948 0.8670 0.8394 0.8524
Standard deviation 0.1162 0.1134 0.1112 0.0963
Mean S.D. time since moved 10.6521 11.4233 11.2733 11.5503
Standard deviation 1.7649 1.3880 1.3549 1.1108
Mean S.D. age head 16.0495 15.9543 15.7162 15.8541
Standard deviation 1.4446 1.2912 1.3724 1.1346
Mean C.V. home value 0.7785 0.7084 0.6328 0.5604
Standard deviation 0.1591 0.1693 0.1542 0.1220
——— Renters ———
Mean C.V. household income 0.9693 0.9628 0.9644 0.9480
Standard deviation 0.1526 0.1774 0.1661 0.1416
Mean S.D. time since moved 5.6055 6.4128 6.9176 6.2490
Standard deviation 1.3377 1.3223 1.9325 1.2618
Mean S.D. age head 16.9028 17.6863 16.8909 16.3005
Standard deviation 2.0836 2.0382 1.7669 1.6309
Mean C.V. gross rent 0.5095 0.5080 0.4909 0.4784
Standard deviation 0.0860 0.0870 0.0894 0.0757






PUMAs quartile quartile quartile quartile
Number of Households 349 327 398 277
——— Homeowners ———
Median income 51,000 53,000 62,200 68,950
Median time since moved 8 8 8 8
Median age head 49 48 48 48
Median home value 95,000 112,500 162,500 225,000
S.D. relative income 1.1660 1.1034 1.0504 1.0760
S.D. diﬀ. time since moved 10.8661 11.7818 11.5142 11.7488
S.D. diﬀ. age head 16.1431 16.0068 11.5142 15.7554
S.D. relative home value 1.0287 .9023 .7856 .6534
——— Renters ———
Median income 27,000 26,100 30,500 34,000
Median time since moved 4 4 4 4
Median age head 37 38 39 38
Median gross rent 573 560 667 767
S.D. relative income 1.3253 1.3337 1.3788 1.3033
S.D. diﬀ. time since moved 5.8399 6.6317 7.9955 6.5087
S.D. diﬀ. age head 16.8338 17.7254 17.0313 16.2931
S.D. relative gross rent .5272 .5347 .5243 .5087
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